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Abstrak 
Tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa perang melawan terorisme 
dipercaya sebagai salah satu bentuk perang dunia yang 
imbasnya merambah ke berbagai negara. Hal ini dapat 
dipahami setelah apa yang sudah terjadi apalagi pasca tragedi 
9/11 yang semakin mengkristalkan perlawanan terhadap aksi 
terorisme. Sekilas melihat perkembangan persoalan tersebut, 
terorisme diyakini lahir dari ketidakpuasan dan ketidakadilan di 
masyarakat. Namun, pada perkembangan selanjutnya, 
terorisme juga diartikan sebagai suatu bentuk simbol dari 
kebencian terhadap Barat. Menurut analisa Peter Berger, 
gerakan terorisme semakin hari semakin sulit untuk dilacak dan 
diantisipasi karena sifatnya yang sering kali berubah-ubah. 
Artikel ini ingin mengulas perubahan-perubahan yang terjadi 
dalam gerakan terorisme dunia, sekaligus mengurai evolusi 
tujuan dan misi dari gerakan tersebut. Kesimpulan yang 
diperoleh dari artikel ini adalah bahwa gerakan terorisme itu 
mempunyai banyak bentuk dari gerakan teroris non-Negara, 
kelompok-kelompok ideologis, kelompok-kelompok politik 
berbasis agama. Semua gerakan ini mempunyai taktik, strategi, 
organisasi, dan garis komando yang terdesentralisasi dengan 
baik. Temuan dalam artikel ini juga menunjukkan bahwa 
gerakan konter-terorisme dengan membombardir pusat-pusat 
teroris seperti Afganistan, dan Iraq dan menangkap dan atau 
membunuh petinggi-petinggi teroris seperti Al-Qaeda ataupun 
JI tidak menghentikan gerakan terorisme karena mereka akan 
bermetamorfosis ke dalam bentuk gerakan lain. 
Kata kunci: Terorisme, Barat, al-Qaeda, Kelompok Radikal. 
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Introduction 
The international war against terrorism is considered as the first 
genuinely global war. This is symbolized by trends such as the increasing 
tendency of countries to take part in international cooperation to prevent 
security threats. Global war against terrorism became more prominent 
after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 
the United States, referred to as 9/11. Terrorism took root due to the 
growing sense of dissatisfaction and injustice in society and the inability 
of governments to realize the hopes and demands growing in these 
communities. Reliance on ideology whether Marxism-Leninism, 
nationalism or religion, has increased.1 These ideologies become part of 
an effort to legitimize the various practices of violence that become the 
core of terrorism.  
Meanwhile, acts of terror associated with the hatred against 
Western domination HAVE spread, not only in the countries that are 
considered part of Western hegemony, but also IN countries that do not 
have direct links with the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia. 
Indonesia is an example, having been rocked by four suicide bombings 
associated with transnational terrorism network: the Bali bombing on 12 
October 2002, the Marriot hotel bombing on 5 August 2003, Australian 
Embassy bombing in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, and the second Bali 
bombing on 1 October 2005.2 This does not include a number of 
terrorist acts carried out in Indonesia during the year 2001 until the year 
2010, which targeted public facilities which were symbols of the West, 
like McDonalds Restaurant, Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant, and 
others. Other countries have also experienced similar incidents as 
happened in Indonesia. For instance, Turkey, Pakistan and India have 
experienced several acts of terror in the name of religion, as a symbol of 
hatred against the West.  
Peter Bergen says that the actions of terrorist groups after 9/11 
tend to be less anticipated. Tactics have changed as groups adjust to the 
                                                          
1 B Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 38. 
2 Tan, A.T (ed.). A Hand Book of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. (Cornwall: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 38.  
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Global War against terrorism. The target of transnational terrorist groups 
is no longer the homeland of Western countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom or Australia, but on the assets associated 
with the Western countries throughout the world. He said that, in the 
case of bombing in the subway station and airport in the United 
Kingdom, terrorist acts can still occur suddenly in Western countries.  
The various examples mentioned above actually confirm that the 
patterns of terrorism or terrorist organizations have changed and 
evolved. These changes reflect the changes in the goals/objectives of 
terrorism, as well as the organization of terrorism, which tend to scatter 
after the fall of Taliban regime. Also people from a number of 
prominent terrorist organizations, both at the local, regional and 
transnational level were arrested and killed.3 In addition, the existence of 
peace agreements in several countries that have conflicts with local 
terrorist groups increasingly complement the initial hypothesis that the 
effect of the Global War on Terrorism post-event 9/11 has changed the 
patterns and movements of terrorist groups around the world. The 
question I have addressed in this essay is how terrorist organizations 
have changed and evolved? Therefore, this essay will explain some of the 
changing pattern of terrorism/terrorist group slightly, and will focus 
more on the new pattern of organizational structure and command of 
terrorist group. 
 
Patterns of Change 
Firstly, there is the changing nature of terrorist organizations’ 
ideology and goals. Throughout history the ideologies of terrorist groups 
have been diverse, ranging from Marxism-Leninism, ultra-nationalism, 
religious-based ideology, and others.4 Even some of terrorist 
organizations have mixed their ideology.  For example, the PKK’s (the 
Kurdistan Workers Party) ideology is a mix of Islam, Marxism-Leninism 
combined with Kurdish nationalism. Another example is the Moro 
                                                          
3 Rohan Gunaratna, Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence? 
(London: Reaktion Book Ltd, 2007), 437.  
4 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 84.  
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Islamic Liberation Front, the Pattani rebellion in southern Thailand 
which has adopted an ideology that is a mix between radical Islamism 
and nationalism. The Nationalism-Catholicism ideology in Northern 
Ireland is another example. Meanwhile, there are more radical terrorist 
organizations such as the Red Army in Japan, based on a Marxist-
Leninist ideology that operated outside Japan. Hoffman,5 moreover, 
argues that in the height of the Cold War the majority of terrorist groups 
are left-wing, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations 
and the other terrorist groups are ethno-nationalist/separatist 
organizations which happened in some countries such as in Bosnia, 
Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, and other parts of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. 
However, in 1990s there was a rapid increase in the number of 
religious terrorist groups, while on the other hand the number of ethno-
nationalist terrorist groups decreased significantly. In 1994, it was 
reported that 16 or one-third of the 49 terrorist movements, were 
classified as religious terrorist movements. This number increased in 
1995, with about 46 % (twenty-six terrorist groups) of the fifty-six 
groups identified as being religious terrorist organizations. The trend was 
increasing in 2004, with about 52 groups, or forty-six percent of terrorist 
organizations that existed that year, being classified as religious in 
character, while 32 groups, or 28% were left-wing groups, and 24 groups, 
or twenty-one percent were ethno-nationalist terrorist groups.6 
Another trend shows that the ideology of terrorism tends to be 
‘conical’ in shape in terms of Islamic-based ideology. Jaish 
Mohammed/JEM (Army of Mohammed), a Muslim extremist group based 
in Pakistan and formed by Masood Azhar in early 2000, Ansar al-
Islam/AI (aka Partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, Supporters of Islam), 
a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs formed in September 
2001, the Tunisian Combatant Group/TCG or the Jama’a Combattaante 
Tunisienne aiming to form an Islamic regime in Tunisia established in 
                                                          
5 Ibid,. 85. 
6 Ibid,. 86. 
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2000,  are all examples of Islamic terrorist groups that were founded in 
the year 2000.7 
There were a greater number of terrorist attacks in the early years 
of twenty-first century, such as, the September 11 2001 attacks, known 
as (9/11), the target being the World Trade Center Tower and the 
Pentagon, in which more than 3000 people were killed and thousands 
were wounded. There was also the Madrid train bombing on 11 March 
2004, in which 191 were killed and 1800 were wounded. The 7 July 2005 
London bombing, also known as 7/7, was carried out by extremist 
Muslims.  
The goals and the objectives of terrorist organizations are varied 
and diverse, namely, to create terror and disrupt socio-political stability 
in a state, to end the Western countries hegemony, separatism, and/or to 
form an international Islamic government. However, each group has 
specific objectives according to their typology and motivation.  Ethno-
nationalist groups (or separatist organization) such as the Basque 
Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA), formed in 1959 
aim at establishing a state based on Marxism in northern Spain. They 
have been involved in the bombing and killing of Spanish Government 
officials, politicians and so on. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party is one of 
the groups that use violence and terror to gain independence from 
Turkey and establish a democratic Kurdish State in the Middle East. 
Thus, according to Williams in regional terrorism where only one 
nationality and country is involved, it often involves separatist or ethno-
nationalist separatism.8 
Ideological terrorist groups, for example The Red Brigades, 
which waged a campaign against the Italian Republic in the 1970s and 
1980s, aimed at creating a neo-communist state and socio-economic 
system. Another example of this type is the German Baader-Meinhof, 
and the Japanese Red Army. Examples of religious-political groups 
(National Liberation Organizations), are Hamas and Fatah, whose 
                                                          
7 C William, Terrorism Explained, the Fact About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups (Adelaide: 
New Holland Publishers, 2004), 177. 
8 Ibid, 39. 
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objective is to create an Islamic Republic of Palestine and ultimately 
dismantle the state of Israel.9 
On the other hand, the new pattern of terrorist groups, known as 
International/transnational terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, is 
motivated by primarily anti-Western religious ideology.10 Their absolute 
objective is changing the entire international system. They tend to focus 
more on the desire to break and end the Western hegemony, especially 
by the United States of America, whose leaders are as considered to be 
the infidels and the enemy of Islam, and to force the United States to 
withdraw from Muslim lands. Another objective is to change Muslim 
regimes that they consider of betraying the true Islam and of coalition 
with the US and its allies. 
The global war against terrorism led by the United States 
government, and its policy to act as the police of the world, who can 
justify all their actions, together with the US foreign policy toward the 
Palestine-Israel conflict has raised the hatred of individuals, groups and 
even countries, both towards the US and its Allies. Under the Bush 
administration, the United States has labelled some countries as the ‘axis 
of evil’ and certain organizations as terrorist movements. As a 
consequence, dissatisfaction emerged, especially in third world countries.  
However, other terrorist organizations with different purposes, also still 
exist in some countries. 
Turning to the terrorist group’s target and tactic, traditional 
terrorist group intend to produce a political effect through the injury or 
death of the victim.11 They want to destabilize the normal political 
condition and create political change in a local, regional even 
international through mass destruction. The objective is to pressure the 
authority to concede their demands.12 They attacked “symbolic” targets 
                                                          
9 B Ganor, Terrorist Organisation Typologies and The Probability of A Boomerang Effect, Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008), 271-272.   
10 M Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Barkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), 127. 
11 D.J. Whittaker, (ed.), The Terrorism Reader (New York: Routledge, 2003), 16. 
12 D.M. Jones (ed.), Globalization and the New Terror (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), 
30 
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representing the source of their hostility or kidnapped and assassinated 
specific people whom they considered guilty of economic exploitation or 
political repression. 
For example, left-wing terrorists like German Red Army Faction 
(RAF) and the Italian Red Brigades (RB) have selectively kidnapped and 
assassinated people whom they blamed for economic exploitation or 
political repression in order to attract publicity and promote a Marxist-
Leninist revolution. Similarly, Hamas and Hezbollah have specific target, 
mostly the Israeli military that they considered as their enemy who 
occupy Palestinian territory and Southern Lebanon respectively.  
Generally, all terrorist groups have one trait in common: They do 
not commit actions randomly or senselessly. Their purpose is aimed at 
gaining publicity. According to Brian Jenkins “terrorist wants a lot of people 
watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead”. Jenkins 
continued to argue that “Terrorist operate on the principle of the minimum force 
necessary, they find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for 
their purposes”.13 By causing disorder, disturbing socio-political stability of 
a state, they hope that dramatic and shocking incidents of violence will 
attract attention of the media and, in turn, of the public and government 
as well.  
On the other hand, the new pattern of terrorist groups, known as 
International/transnational terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda, they 
targeted terror no longer in gaining publicity, but in causing carnage on 
massive scale.14 Through Osama bin Laden and Aymân al-Zawâhirî 
(both are the supreme leaders of Al Qaeda), that Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates should “Kill Westerners. Kill American. Kill Jews”. This message 
conformed to the fatwa issued on 23 February 1998 that announced the 
setting up of a World Islamic Front for Jihad and declared that ‘it is the 
duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens –civilian or military--, and their allies 
everywhere’. Therefore, they do not have any specific target but to kill a lot 
of people that are assumed as Westerners, American, and Jews. The 
                                                          
13 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 270. 
14 T.J. Wilkinson, Archaeological Landscapes of the Near East (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 2003), 34.  
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event of 9/11 is the example of international terrorist attacks which 
killed more than 3000 people, and thousands of people were injured.  
Another new trend is that the threat of terrorist attack is shifting 
from military, political and diplomatic targets to economic targets. Al 
Qaeda estimated that it would cost the United States would US$ 1 
million dollars in every one dollar spent by Al Qaeda. In the event of 
9/11, the United States suffered from several losses, human lives 
(insurance costs), property costs, emergency response and clean-up 
costs, health effects, temporary housing, lost employee income, lost 
employee income, lost expenditures, lost tax revenues, travel delays for 
commuters etc. Its estimated that the World Trade Center attack cost $ 
80 billion.15  
Similarly, the attacks on the U.S navy destroyer USS Cole (DDG 
67) on October 12, 2000, in Aden Yemen by terrorist using small 
motorboat caused long impact of economic deterioration such as the 
decline in Yemen shipping revenue.16 Moreover, the Bali bombing 1 had 
impact on the stability of Indonesian national economy. The decline in 
tourism revenue, loss of income, the replacement costs of damaged 
goods and infrastructure were very costly. 
The economic targets rarely appeared in traditional terrorist 
group. As mentioned earlier, they kidnapped or killed specific persons or 
figureheads that they blamed as enemies and, or attack a symbolic public 
infrastructure to attract media, public and in turn a government’s 
attention.   
There has been a new phenomenon occurring in terrorist groups 
in that some of the terrorist movements have ended their conflicts with 
regimes and made peace agreement to avoid being labeled as a terrorist 
organization, and changed into formal organizations with the aim of 
enhancing their bargaining power with the authorities. However, this 
trend is not new, having already occurred in the Palestine Liberation 
                                                          
15 W Enders, The Political Economy of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 1. 
16  Ibid., 203. 
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Organization (PLO).17 The PLO acted as an umbrella organization, 
consisting of numerous militant factions as well as other Palestinian 
associations. The Palestine Liberation Organization acted as a Palestinian 
legal representative in negotiating with Israel authorities with respect to 
the liberation of Palestine from Israeli control.18 The PLO had an 
agreement with Israel to form the Palestinian Authority to govern the 
domestic affairs in Gaza and the West Bank, while the PLO has 
responsibility for external affairs, particularly in Lebanon.19 Similarly, 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) in Indonesia, after 
reaching a peace agreement with Indonesian authorities, officially signed 
on 15 August 2005, changed into two political parties, Partai Aceh and 
Partai SIRA.20 Interestingly, the Aceh party (or parties) won the election 
and had the majority of seats in the provincial parliament.  
Another example is Hezbollah which is still considered an 
Islamic terrorist group by the United States of America, Israel and some 
Western countries. It is considered similar to Al Qaeda but operates in 
the context of National Liberation, just like Hamas. Part of the reason 
for this is that, Hezbollah killed more than 240 marines in an attack on 
marine barracks in 1983. Both of these organizations have fought Israel 
in the Lebanese and Palestinian contexts, respectively.21  Hezbollah has 
transformed itself from a radical, clandestine militia to a moderate 
organization, and has participated in Lebanese general elections.  
Local people see Hezbollah as a political movement and a social 
service that has done everything that a government should do, from 
collecting the garbage to running hospitals and repairing schools.22 
Winning hearts and minds, Hezbollah has not only armed and political 
wings – it also boasts an extensive social development program. The 
                                                          
17  Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 74. 
18 A Mannes, Profiles in Terror; The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organization (United 
States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2004), 269. 
19  Ibid., 288. 
20 Ben Hillman, “Aceh's Rebels Turn to Ruling”. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 170, 
No. 1 (January-February 2007), 51.  
21 P.P. Harik, Hezbollah, the Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 
2005),1. 
22 Ibid., 196. 
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group currently operates at least four hospitals, 12 clinics, 12 schools and 
two agricultural centres that provide farmers with technical assistance 
and training. It also has an environmental department and an extensive 
social assistance program. Medical care is also cheaper than in most of 
the country’s private hospitals and free for Hezbollah members. Most of 
these institutions are located in the country’s more marginalized areas, 
such as Beirut’s southern suburbs, in South Lebanon and in the Beka 
Valley.23 
The changing patterns of terrorist organizations relate to the 
pattern of organizational structure and command. The orthodox 
organization of terrorist movements is diagrammatically represented by 
the pyramid,24 which means that they were organized along the lines of 
the predominant hierarchical model of other organizations, existing in all 
political, social and religious structures in the world today. Thus the 
organization was similar to that which existed in governments, 
corporations and the military, with the mass of the members at the 
bottom and the leaders at the top. There are clear divisions of authority 
between the leadership, officials, activists and supporters. The decisions 
made at the top of the international terrorist organizations were 
communicated to and carried out by those below, including in regional 
and local areas.25 In short, it is a well-defined command and control 
apparatus.26 
The Lebanese Hezbollah, for example, has been known to be 
governed “on the national and local level by the supreme political-
religious leadership, composed of a small and selected group of Lebanese 
ulama”.27 The Hezbollah is governed by the Majlîs al-Shûrâ (Consultative 
Assembly) which is headed by 12 senior clerical members (including the 
Secretary-General who is elected every two years) with responsibility for 
tactical decisions and supervision of overall Hezbollah activity 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 197. 
24 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 271.  
25  B Ganor, Terrorist Organisation Typologies and The Probability of A Boomerang Effect, Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2008). 276. 
26 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 267. 
27 B. Nacos, Terrorism and counterterrorism, understanding threats and responses in the post-9/11 
world (New York: Longman Publisher, 2008), 147. 
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throughout Lebanon. Within the Majlîs al-Shûrâ, there existed seven 
specialized committees dealing with ideological, financial, military and 
political, judicial, informational and social affairs. In turn, the Majlîs al-
Shûrâ and these seven committees were replicated in each of Hezbollah's 
three main operational areas (the Beqaa, Beirut, and the South). In 
December 1989, Hezbollah formed a new body known as Majlîs al-Shûrâ 
al-Karrar (the Deciding Assembly) to control the administration of 
Hezbollah.28 
More recently, however, terrorist movements have abandoned 
the hierarchical structure and adopted the “leaderless resistance”.29 
Sageman calls it “Leaderless Jihad”. They tend to use a linear structure 
rather than a hierarchical one.30 The aim is to prevent governments from 
destroying the movements. These kinds of terrorist group are organised 
in loosely interconnected, semi-independent cells that have no single 
commanding hierarchy.  
The basic characteristic of the structure is that there is no explicit 
communication between cells which are otherwise acting toward the 
same goals.31 Members of one cell usually have little or no specific 
information on who else is agitating on behalf of their cause. All groups 
and individuals operate independently from one another and from a 
central command. Although, they are less competent in technique and 
tactics, they have freedom and independence in decision-making and in 
the operation of terror attacks.32  
Consequently, the absence of a central command authority has 
the potential to give a terrorist more opportunities and freedom to 
commit acts of violence, which, in turn, makes them more unpredictable 
and uncontrollable. However, a top leader is still crucial. Leaderless 
movements may often have symbolic figureheads. It can be a public 
figure or an inspirational author, who picks generic targets and 
                                                          
28 Mannes, Profiles in Terror, 159. 
29 Nacos, Terrorism and counterterrorism, 148.  
30 B Hoffman, Change and Continuity in Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 418). 
31 M Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 145. 
32 B Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 272.  
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objectives, but does not actually manage or execute plans.33 Leaders 
communicate their intention periodically and non-specifically, including 
by making public pronouncements. Groups are affiliated through both 
formal and informal links. Decision-making and operations are often 
highly decentralized. A good example of this is Osama bin Laden, the 
leader of Al Qaeda, and his deputy Aymân al-Zawâhirî. They did not try 
to impose their authority, but nevertheless proved themselves as main 
figure. This model of terrorism is also termed “phantom cell networks”, 
“autonomous leadership unit”, “network of networks”, or “lone 
wolves”.34 
 
Al Qaeda: The “Network of Networks” Terrorism  
Al Qaeda means “the Base”, which is based in Afghanistan, is the 
most visible manifestation of the terrorist threat. It operates as a 
transnational terrorism organization comprised of multinational 
individuals and fundamentalist Sunnis calling for global Jihad with 
multinational members.35 This transnational terrorist group is the best 
example of how the terrorist movement has evolved and changed from 
the hierarchical model terrorist group into its new incarnation, the 
“network of networks” terrorist group.36 Al Qaeda is the most 
threatening terrorist group in relation to the stability of world security. 
To exist, adapt and survive, it has evolved and reorganized through 
several stages. The first was top-down command to manage its tactics 
and strategies. The second was a “network of networks”. The third was 
by using a guerrilla base and the last was interlinks with another 
transnational or separatist rebel groups.37 
                                                          
33  Nacos, Terrorism and counterterrorism, 150.  
34 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 271.  
35 Mannes, Profiles in Terror, 18.  
36 B Hoffman. The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27 (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004). 
552. 
37 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 57. 
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Structurally, Al Qaeda was a unitary organization,38 with a 
centralized, top-down organization,39 which had many characteristics of a 
hierarchical organization. It had permanent installations, fixed structure, 
standardized methods and regular procedures. The structure of Al Qaeda 
consisted of the emir as the top leader, Osama bin Laden), advised by 
Majlîs al-Shûrâ, or a consultative council, consisting of high echelon 
apparatus and very experienced cadres, such as Dr. Aymân al-Zawâhirî, 
Abû Ayûb al-Irâqî, Abû H {afs al-Khâbir.40 Below the Majlîs al-Shûrâ there 
were four committees: a military one that was responsible for recruiting, 
training, procuring, transporting and launching military operations as 
well as developing tactics and strategies, a finance, a religious and a 
media committee.41  
In August 1996, al-Qaeda announced its jihad to expel foreign 
troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands. Bin Ladîn 
issued a fatwa, which amounted to a public declaration of war against the 
United States of America and any of its allies, and began to refocus al-
Qaeda's resources towards large-scale, propagandist strikes.42  
On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden and Aymân al-
Zawâhirî, a leader of an Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with three other 
Islamist leaders, co-signed and issued a fatwa (binding religious edict) 
calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies where they could 
and when they could.43 Under the banner of the World Islamic Front for 
Combat against the Jews and Crusaders they declared: 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and 
military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in 
any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the 
al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [in Makka] 
from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all 
the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. 
                                                          
38 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 283.  
39 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 134. 
40 Ibid., 57.  
41 Mannes, Profiles in Terror, 35.  
42 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 42.  
43 P Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, the Liberal State Respons. (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 5.  
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This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, 'and fight 
the pagans all together as they fight you all together,' and 'fight 
them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there 
prevail justice and faith in Allah'.44 
Al-Qaeda has attacked targets, civilian and military, in various 
countries, most notably, the September 11 attacks on New York City and 
Washington, D.C. in 2001. The U.S. government responded by 
launching the War on Terror. According to the results of the Strategic 
Survey, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
based in London, at least 18,000 Al Qaeda members were trained in 
camps in Afghanistan during the period between 1996 and 2001.45 
However, this number has been reduced as most of the cadres were 
killed and arrested as a result of the global war against terrorism. In 2001, 
Gunaratna stated that the core force of Al Qaeda consisted of more than 
3000 members, along with linkages with terrorist groups that spread out 
all over the world, in at least 60 countries. 
Wilkinson identifies Al Qaeda major affiliates and support 
groups: “Egypt (Jihad Islamic Group), Algerian (GIA and GSPC), Libya 
(Libyan Islamic Fighting Group), Lebanon (Asbât al-Ans}âr), 
Kashmir/Pakistan (Lashkar el Tayyiba, H {arakat al-Mujâhidîn, Lashkar e 
Jhangvi, Jaish e Mohammad), Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah –Islamic Group--), 
Iraq (Al Qaeda Jihad Organization Mesopotamia, Ans }âr al Islâm), Yemen 
(Islamic Army of Yemen), Morocco (Morroccan Islamic Combatant Group), 
Afghanistan (H {izb al Islâm/Gulbuddin), Saudi Arabia (Al Qaeda in Arabian 
peninsula), Europe (various localized networks including the Secret Organization of 
Al Qaeda in Europe), Africa (various localized networks especially in East 
Africa)”. 
William46 argues that the “link from, or with Al Qaeda” has 
several characteristics including funding for a spiritual leader’s activities. 
                                                          
44 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 95. 
45  B Hoffman, The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27 (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), 
552.  
46 C. William, Terrorism Explained, the Fact About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups (Adelaide: 
New Holland Publishers, 83-84.  
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Al Qaeda, for example, has provided military training in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan or elsewhere or trainers at a local level. It has financed 
operational and logistical support, such as the provision of weapons.  
Al Qaeda also has attempted to strengthen its regional operation. 
William also describes the kind of connections between regional terrorist 
groups and individuals as including “affiliated” groups that are 
considered as part of Al Qaeda networks, which operate in Muslim 
societies or countries with Islamic communities, and “associated” free 
actors, such as Ramzie Yousef the bomber of the World Trade Centre in 
1993, who was supported by Al Qaeda.47 He (siapa?) also describes  
other connections such as the “empathetic” one, which consists of a 
group of terrorists driven by local problems, but who have developed 
links with Al Qaeda, such as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Free 
Aceh Movement in Indonesia. This movement has Al Qaeda 
representatives in some regions, such as Omar Al Faruq). Gunaratna 
adds another type which consists of Al Qaeda cells operating in the 
West.48  All these types of connection involve the sharing of expertise, 
the transfer of resources, discussion of strategy and even the conducting 
of joint operations. 
 
Decentralization 
Since the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, followed by 
Iraq in March 2003, the Al Qaeda operational home base was destroyed. 
More than half of its leaders and higher echelon members were killed or 
arrested, such as Abu Zubaidah, Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, Abdullah al 
Rahim al Nishiri, Ramzi bi al Shibh and Taufik bin Attash.49 In addition 
more than 3400 cadres were killed or arrested.50 Moreover, financial 
support was reduced as their assets had been frozen. As a consequence, 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 83-84. 
48 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 95.  
49 William, C. 2004. Terrorism Explained, the Fact About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups. 
Adelaide: New Holland Publishers. 512. 
50 W Enders, The Political Economy of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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the power of Al Qaeda weakened. However, Al Qaeda senior leader, 
Aymân al-Zawâhirî denies this, and claims that Al Qaeda is still strong 
and capable of carrying out attacks at least twice per year.51 
Nevertheless, Al Qaeda did suffer from the loss of its operational 
leaders and main base. In order to continue existing, Al Qaeda has 
changed its strategy. The weakened Al Qaeda has relied on individual, 
regional and local terrorist groups worldwide to retain and regain its 
strong presence. Therefore, Al Qaeda has formed networks with local 
and regional radical groups aiming to influence and transform a global 
jihadist mind-set.52 These networks cover leadership, planning and 
operational matters, financial matters, training and equipment support as 
well as propaganda and several other functions.53   
Al Qaeda has decentralized, deregulated and regionalised.  All 
local, regional terrorist group networks and individuals are semi-
autonomous, being able to make their own decisions and operate 
independently or, at the very least, follow broad general directions. The 
supreme leader, Osama bin Laden does not have to be in command or 
have central control.54 Jessica Stern has noted:  
“In one article on the ‘culture of jihad’ available on-line, a Saudi 
Islamist urges bin Laden sympathizers to take action without 
waiting for instructions. “I do not need to meet the Sheikh 
(Osama bib Laden) and ask his permission to carry out some 
operation”, he writes, “the same as I do not need permission to 
pray, or to think about killing Jews and the Crusaders that gather 
on our lands”.55  
One of the focuses of this essay is on the links between Al 
Qaeda and terrorist groups existing in Southeast Asia. Abuza identifies 
several reasons why this region became one of the main focus points in 
Al Qaeda’s terrorist campaign. Most of the countries in this region are 
considered as “countries of convenience”. These countries are very 
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53 Ibid., 438. 
54 Ibid.   
55 Nacos, Terrorism and counterterrorism, 150. 
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conducive to operation at a local level since they suffer from a lack of 
law and order, poorly regulated banking, increasing corruption especially 
in security and the police department, border problems and the easy 
availability of weapons. Secondly, the aim is the spread of the Islamic 
fundamentalist views, such as Wahhabism especially Deobandism. 
Al Qaeda has sought out Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) and 
it has become his close ally in the region. Most of the members of 
Jemaah Islamiyah are the remnants of Mujahidin fighters who trained 
and joined the war in Afghanistan. Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) is 
believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand. Jemaah Islamiyah has its roots in Dâr al-Islâm (DI, meaning 
“House of Islam”), a radical movement in Indonesia in the 1940s that 
aimed to establish a unified Islamic nation based on Shari’ah among the 
countries of Southeast Asia.56  
It was formally founded on January 1, 1993, by Jemaah Islamiyah 
leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, both are strongly 
influenced by Osama bin Laden’s terrorist ideology and methodology, 
aiming to create an Islamic state comprising the Southeast Asia region of 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Southern Philippines and 
southern Thailand. Soon after its founding, Jemaah Islamiyah became an 
Al-Qaeda affiliate, receiving financial and material support from the 
group. Several top Jemaah Islamiyah operatives even received instruction 
in Afghan training camps. In terms of terrorist action, the Jemaah 
Islamiyah has been responsible for a number of recent and deadly 
terrorist attack in Southeast Asia, including the Bali bombing on 12 
October 2002, the Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, and the second Bali bombing 
on 1 October 2005.57 It has also been responsible for the newest 
bombing on the JW. Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotel on 17 July 2009. 
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In its first founding, Jemaah Islamiyah employed a top-down 
hierarchical organisation. The leader (Amîr), a leadership council 
(Markâz) and consultative councils (Shûrâ) oversaw four geographic 
divisions (Mantiqi). Each Mantiqi ws divided into smaller sub-groups (as 
represented below) which administered Jemaah Islamiyah activity 
appropriate to their area. Mantiqi I and IV were focused on fundraising. 
Mantiqî II was focused on leadership and recruitment. Mantiqî III was 
focused on training.58 This mirrored the organization within Al Qaeda, 
due to the effect of the global war against terrorism. Because their 
leaders and members were arrested, Jemaah Islamiyah transformed into 
cells and clandestine networks or morphed into local groups. 
Jemaah Islamiyah has a strategy of recruitment and expansion of 
cells, religious indoctrination and training of its members, and instigation 
of sectarian conflict. Guntur Romli, reinforcing what Abuza argued, 
states that in order to expand their networks and cells, Jemaah Islamiyah 
tends to use certain recruitment patterns. Firstly, they use ideology as an 
instrument. Generally, they tend to indoctrinate the ideology of terror, 
violence, hatred, and the desire to eliminate those who are considered 
enemies. This ideology resonates with the bay’at system (total loyalty to 
the leader). Secondly, they use kinship as an instrument. As a terrorist 
network, Jemaah Islamiyah is a closed-network organization operating 
underground by storing data and strategies. The main principle on which 
it is built is the trust that derives from family and kinship. There is 
evidence that the Bali bombers are siblings, namely Amrozi, Ali Ghurfon 
and Ali Imron.59 Moreover, recruiting, training, indoctrination, financial 
and operational links between the Jemaah Islamiyah and other militant 
groups, such as al-Qaeda, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Misuari Renegade/Breakaway 
Group (MRG/MBG) and the Philippine Rajah Sulaiman movement 
(RSM) have existed for many years, and continue to this day. 
In addition, Jemaah Islamiyah has shown the ability to operate 
with different patterns and has on occasion morphed into local terrorist 
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groups. In Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah has transformed charities and 
non-gevernmental agencies (NGOs), such Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, 
created in Yogyakarta 1999 into radical Islamic organizations. This 
includes established publisher Wihdah Press, a magazine (Risâlah 
Mujâhidîn), and also Ar-Rahmah Media. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia also 
serves as a link between Jemaah Islamiyah and Saudi financiers. Many 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia leaders hold or have held concurrent 
positions in Saudi charities and their Indonesian counterparts have been 
used to support terrorist activities. These include the Saudi Al-Haramain 
and the International Islamic Relief Organization, and two Indonesian 
charities, KOMPAK and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity.60  Like 
Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah has evolved into a separatist group in 
southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. While in Malaysia, 
Jemaah Islamiyah was transformed into an organization of Islamic 
doctrine.  
Al Qaeda also relies on individuals especially in diaspora 
communities to commit terrorist acts, especially in Europe. The 
individual may be less competent but he/she is still capable of carrying 
out more bloody terrorist acts. For example, the Madrid bombing was 
carried out by a Moroccan migrant. This was also the case with the 
immigrant who was responsible for the London subway bombing.  
Before the event of 9/11, Al Qaeda was backed up by two 
models of cell members: support networks which distributed 
propaganda, fund raised, trained supported and provided safe housing, 
and secondly operational networks which conducted the terrorist acts.61 
Each cell had its own duties and responsibilities to succeed in terrorist 
attacks.  
However, in the post 9/11 period, the support networks in 
Europe and North America were transformed into operational networks. 
This was apparent in the Madrid bombing which was conducted by 
support networks which had changed into operational networks. They 
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were free to act and conduct terror operations without any instruction 
from the supreme leader. Esa al Britani, the leader of a terrorist cell, for 
example, avoided using mobile phones, never had credit card or a bank 
account and always moved from home to home in order to avoid the 
supervision and surveillance of government, police and security force.62  
This means that Al Qaeda networks and cells still exist as 
ideological movements in Europe and North America (and other places), 
although they are no longer present as formal organizations anymore. 
 
Conclusion 
From the short description above, the terrorist groups still exist 
and are present everywhere. It may be in the color of non-state terrorist 
movement, ideological groups, religio-political groups or religion-based 
ideology. Furthermore, some of these groups have evolved and morphed 
into the new patterns of terrorist movement. They have new tactics, 
strategies, loose organization, decentralized command and control 
adjusting to the global war against terrorism. Their terror action tends to 
be less anticipated and unpredictable. The best example of this is Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates which are motivated by anti-Western religious 
ideology.  
In this context, I have considered concentration and full alert 
needed by Western countries in particular, as well as other countries 
around the world, to specifically give attention to the global war against 
terrorism. Hit and run tactics practiced by the terrorist organization 
provided a valuable lesson and demonstrated that the global war on 
terrorism needs to be improved. This is because of the spirit of Jihad and 
ready to die for honor, nation, and religion are the main reasons for the 
perpetrators of terror, both at national, regional, or transnational levels 
post-event 9/11.  
The assumption that by invading and destroying the states where 
the terrorist organizations are based, as was done in Afghanistan or Iraq, 
terrorism would end has proven to be an assumption that is not entirely 
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true. Similarly, the capturing and killing of several high-ranking terrorists 
from organizations like Al Qaeda, or Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast 
Asia does not guarantee an end to terrorism.  
The arrest of terrorist top leaders, affiliates and cells do not 
necessarily mean that terrorism will disappear and remove its threat. In 
fact, the invasion by the United States and its allies of Afghanistan, and 
Iraq, the arrests and killing of a number of members of terrorist 
organization, had led to changes in terrorist organizations, patterns, 
strategies and targets, which in turn will complicate the efforts of many 
countries in countering terrorism in the context of the global war against 
terrorism. 
 
Bibliography 
Abuza, Z. “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model; Assessing 
Hezbollah's Influence”. Dalam Middle east quarterly, Winter, 2009, Vol. 
xvi, No. 1., 2009. 
Buckley, M and Fawn, R (ed.). Global Response to Terrorism, 9/11, Afghanistan and 
Beyond. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003. 
Chaliand, G and Blin, A. (ed.). The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda. 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007. 
Enders, W. The Political Economy of Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
Ganor, B. Terrorist Organisation Typologies and The Probability of a Boomerang Effect, 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2008. 
Greenberg, K (ed.). Al Qaeda Now, Understanding Today’s Terrorist. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Gunaratna, R. Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence? 
London: Reaktion Book Ltd., 2007. 
Gunaratna, R. Inside Al Qaeda, Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002. 
 22|Akhmad Najibul Khairi – The Changing Pattern of Terrorism 
Harik, P.P. Hezbollah, the Changing Face of Terrorism. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd., 2005. 
Hillman, Ben. “Aceh's Rebels Turn to Ruling”, dalam Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Vol. 170, No. 1, January-February, 2007. 
Hoffman, B. Change and Continuity in Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 
London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2001. 
__________. The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism, 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27. London: Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2004. 
__________. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
http://www.meforum.org/2044/jemaah-islamiyah-adopts-the-hezbollah-
model. 
Jones, D.M. (ed.). Globalisation and the New Terror. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2004. 
Juergensmeyer, M. Terror in the Mind of God. Barkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003. 
Kegley, C (ed.). The New Global Terrorism: Characteristic, Causes, Controls. New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2003. 
Mannes, A. Profiles in Terror; The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organisation. United 
States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004. 
Nacos, B. Terrorism and counterterrorism, understanding threats and responses in the post-
9/11 world. New York: Longman Publisher, 2008. 
Ramakrishna, K and Tan, S. S (eds.). After Bali the Threat of Terrorism Southeast 
Asia. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategies Studies, 2003. 
Romli, M.G. Ustadz, saya sudah di surge. Jakarta: KataKita, 2007. 
Sabasteanski, A. (ed.). Patterns of Global Terrorism 1985-2000, U.S Department of 
State Reports with Supplementary Documents and Statistics. Massachusetts: 
Berkshire Publishing Group, Great Barrington, 2005. 
Sageman, M. Understanding Terror Networks. Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
23Volume 3, Nomor 1, Maret 2013|  
__________. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
Tan, A.T (ed.). A Hand Book of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. 
Cornwall: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007. 
Whittaker, D.J. (ed.). The Terrorism Reader. New York: Routledge, 2001.   
Wilkinson, T.J. Archaeological Landscapes of the Near East. Tucson: The University 
of Arizona Press, 2003. 
Wilkinson, P. Terrorism versus Democracy, the Liberal State Response. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
William, C. Terrorism Explained, the Fact About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups. 
Adelaide: New Holland Publishers, 2004. 
